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Abstract 
This paper reconsiders the role of natural resources in civil wars in light of the continuing debate over whether resource 
scarcity/abundance fuels conflict. We argue the role of resources in a civil war is due to their life-preserving and 
income-generating attributes, not their scarcity or abundance per se; and the effect may differ across resources and 
depending upon whether we examine the onset versus the presence of civil war. We highlight the need to consider 
comprehensive sets of life-preserving and income-generating resources in tandem, as any given resource may affect 
others by way of belonging to the same economy and physical environment. The empirical investigation employs a 
large-N statistical analysis of civil wars. The independent variables include broad sets of life-preserving resources, 
including key environmental conditions pertaining to hospitable climate, and income-generating resources. The results 
indicate that the role of resources in civil war varies by the resource. The size of effect varies depending on whether we 
examine civil war onset or presence, but the sign of the effect essentially does not. 
Keywords: Empirical, Large N sample, Statistical Model, Multiple Resources 
1. Introduction 
―Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting over.‖ This quote, often attributed to the great American writer and 
humorist Mark Twain, captures part of the current debate on the role of natural resources in civil wars. In one view, 
resource scarcity is a major driver of civil wars. A second view argues that resource abundance—not scarcity—is a 
major driver. The debate has generated a large body of case studies and statistical models, but the results have not 
revealed a clear pattern. There is still no consensus.
i
  
We reconsider this debate in hopes of contributing to both the theoretical and the empirical modeling literature. We 
make four key points. (1) The role of resources in a civil war is due to their life-preserving and income-generating 
attributes, not scarcity or abundance. (2) The direction or sign of effects of resource changes on the likelihood or risk of 
civil wars may differ by the resource. (3) The sizes of effect may vary depending upon whether we model onset or 
continuation (presence) of civil wars. (4) Empirical models need to include a broad set of life-preserving and 
income-generating resources, as resource changes may affect each other by way of belonging to the same 
ecological-socioeconomic system. Models including one or few resource measures and studies using broad resource 
aggregates may produce misleading results, and models for onset alone may produce partial results. 
Our theory suggests that increases in life-preserving and income-generating resources may increase or decrease the risk 
of civil war, and the size of effect may vary for onset and presence. The nature of the effect is an empirical issue. We 
develop a regression model for a large N sample of years and countries and employ control variables widely used in the 
literature. The basic idea is not to create a moving target; our interventions in theory and model structure are massive 
enough to merit a careful approach that does not change everything at the same time. The unit of analysis is the 
country-year, as is common in such studies. We measure the dependent variable in two ways: civil war onset focuses on 
the first year of the war, and civil war presence examines all the years of a civil war that lasts more than one year.  
Summarizing our main results, we find the role natural resources play in civil war varies across different types of 
resources. Increases in amounts of some resources increase the risk of civil war, increases in other resources decrease 
the risk while changes for a third group have no effect. The size of effects varies for civil war onset or presence, but 
with one exception, the sign of the effect is always the same.  
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These results hold on average, not in each possible case on its own, as is the case for all regression models. Resources 
that have no significant effect in our model may have played a role in certain civil wars, or could do so in the future 
while resources that do play a role in our model may have been unimportant in some cases. In the rest of the paper, we 
review the prior literature, present our theory, describe our model, detail the findings, and discuss future research and 
implications for public policy.  
2. Prior Literature 
The body of literature is too large to be fully reviewed here, so we highlight representative studies and results. There are 
two broad types of studies, those examining the effect of resource scarcity on civil war and those looking at the effect of 
resource abundance.  
Many scholars argue that scarcity of resources such as fertile land, water, forests, and food can lead to economic decline, 
reducing state ability to provide services and law and order. Grievances over access to resources and the functioning of 
the state may rise, increasing the risk of revolt. Natural disasters may make things worse by damaging resources and 
state capabilities, causing concerns over inadequate relief and/or defenses, and reducing law and order. Others argue 
scarcity-induced factors reduce the risk of civil war by reducing the capabilities and willingness to fight, and increasing 
the chances of cooperation facing a common problem and profit-motivated innovation to alleviate it.
ii 
Other scholars argue that forces already inclined for conflict may fight over abundant resources such as oil, minerals, 
farming commodities, and timber to finance arms purchase, training, and recruitment, and/or to enrich themselves. In 
another logic, resource-rich regions may seek to secede, which the state is likely to reject. Resource-rich countries may 
also experience more public grievances against the state than other countries due to the so-called resource curse. 
Resource booms may draw investment from other sectors, harming them, and foreign investment in the resource sector 
may appreciate the currency, making other exports less competitive. Rent seeking may rise in the resource sector, 
leading to state corruption and mismanagement. The government may pay less attention to public needs since the 
ongoing resource revenues reduce its dependence on taxation. These factors raise the risk of civil war, but some 
scholars argue that the government of resource-rich states can essentially buy followers‘ and public support by using 
resource revenues for paybacks and/or to provide public goods such as free education, healthcare, and help with 
housing.
iii
 
In empirical studies, many case studies find links from scarcity and disasters to civil war; others find no effect.
iv
 For 
statistical models, Esty et al. (1999) find that changes in soil degradation, deforestation, and water scarcity have no 
effect, and Hauge and Ellingsen (2001) find they have a risk-raising effect. De Soysa (2002) finds no effect for an index 
of cropland, pasture, timber, other forest goods, and subsoil assets. Urdal (2005) finds negative or no effect on 
population divided by a sum of cropland, pasture, woodland, forest, and arable land. Binningsbø, De Soysa, and 
Gleditsch (2007) find a negative effect for ecological footprint (a broad total of resource pressures). Hendrix and Glaser 
(2007) find no effect for degraded land and a positive effect for water. Theisen (2008) finds water has no effect and land 
degradation has a negative effect. Weezel (2015) finds no effect for rainfall, but the literature also reports positive and 
negative effects (Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). For natural disasters, Nel and Righarts (2008) and Eastin (2015) find a 
positive effect, Slettebak (2012) a negative effect, and Bergholt and Lujala. (2012) find no effect. 
Case studies show links from abundant minerals, oil, timber, agrarian commodities, and diamonds to civil war.
v
 Hyeran 
(2015) says 41% of rebel groups in 1985-2009 rely chiefly on resources and 27% partly. Yet, many states with these 
abundant resources are internally peaceful (e.g., Australia, Brazil, Botswana, Canada, Ghana, Norway, South Africa, 
U.S., and Venezuela). For models, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003), and Fearon (2005) find no 
effect for primary commodity export (food and non-food agronomy, raw materials, oil, and other material); Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) find an inverted U curve. Humphreys (2005) finds agricultural output value raises the risk. 
Fjelde (2015) finds the opposite. Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore (2005) find diamonds have mixed effects; Ross (2006) 
finds a positive effect, noting there are only a few cases. For oil, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find positive effect, De Soysa 
and Neumayer (2007) mixed impact, Basedau and Lay (2009) negative, and Smith (2015) no effect. For minerals, 
Welsch (2008) finds a positive effect and Rus (2012) finds no effect. 
Taking stock of the literature, the case study results are not generalizable and the statistical results are mixed. Recent 
reviews have offered some interpretations. Koubi, Spilker, Tobias, and Bernauer (2014) see little evidence for scarcity 
as a cause, and some support for abundance. Eastin (2015) sees mixed support for disasters as a cause and strong 
support for disasters prolonging wars. Tobias (2015) sees unsettled evidence for scarcity and much support in case 
studies. Murshed (2015) concludes the effect of abundant resources is not robust. We observe that the samples, designs, 
control variables, and estimation techniques are not significantly different. Perhaps the mixed results have to do with the 
inclusion of one or few resources in the model, or one broad resource aggregate. We can gain insight by reconsidering 
the theoretical basis for the effect of resources on the risk of civil war.  
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3. Approach and Hypotheses 
The previous section highlights disagreements about the role of resources in civil war. The scarcity camp says that a 
decline in scarce resources raises the risk of civil war while the abundance camp says a rise in abundant resources raises 
this risk. This discourse is valuable, but framing the debate in terms of scarcity versus abundance is not without 
limitations. We offer an alternative approach to express the debate and state implied hypotheses. 
Studies typically talk about scarcity and abundance loosely. Something is scarce if there is not enough of it to satisfy 
wants and abundant if there is more than enough of it to go around. Studies usually expect that renewable resources are 
linked to civil war via scarcity, and non-renewable via abundance (Koubi et al., 2014). Yet does this imply scarcity and 
abundance? Why is it that non-renewable resources cannot be scarce or renewable resources cannot be abundant? What 
prevents rebels and state forces from using (scarce) renewable resources to fund their war? Is a non-renewable resource 
abundant only if someone fights over it? Moreover, how do we know if a resource is scarce or abundant in the more 
general context? Do we ask people if their wants are satisfied? Indeed, as one review noted recently, the definitions of 
scarcity and abundance are still not adequate (Mildner, Lauster & Wodni, 2012). 
In fact, scarcity and abundance link to demand and supply from economics. Demand indicates how much of a good 
people want to buy at a given price, given factors such as laws, quality, and substitutes. Supply indicates how much of 
the good firms seek to produce by price, given factors such as laws, substitutes, and other market outlets. If demand 
exceeds supply, there is scarcity; if supply is greater than demand, there is abundance. Economics shows that free 
markets tend to balance demand and supply by good, so scarcity and abundance are transient. This also applies to 
resources. It is difficult to decide if resources or any other goods are scarce or abundant. Further complicating the matter, 
demand and supply are not observable; they are estimated based on data. This complex task is particularly arduous for 
resources not traded in markets (e.g., rainfall, good climate, water in a river, forests). Linking resource import to 
scarcity and export to abundance, as some do, is problematic because in some cases the export may cause scarcity (less 
available at home) and the import abundance (more available). Estimating resource demand and supply by resource and 
country is a Herculean task; we do not know of any study that has systematically done it. 
An alternative approach begins by observing that renewable resources such as fertile land, fresh water, and food crops 
are crucial for preserving life and have no readily available substitutes on a global basis. Resources such as precipitation 
and hospitable climate (e.g., the absence of weather disasters) share these attributes. We label these types of resources as 
life-preserving resources. Non-renewable resources such as minerals and fossil fuels, and renewables such as timber, in 
contrast, are not crucial for life per se, have readily available substitutes, and are market-ready in their extracted form. 
For example, oil and metals have substitutes, and we can essentially survive without them even if their substitutes are 
not readily available; it is their market value, rather than intrinsic value, that gives them importance. We refer to these 
resources as income-generating resources. 
The two resource classes may sometimes overlap. For example, oil for pumps that defend a city lying below sea level 
behind a dike preserves life, and selling freshwater generates income. Ultimately, however, society cannot survive 
without fresh water while people living in that city can move elsewhere. The two resource groups are valued for 
different reasons—survival and lack of substitutes versus market-ready extraction and substitutability. Using these 
categories enables moving from the non-observable to observable attributes, and is useful in forming hypotheses for the 
effect of resource changes on the risk of civil war. 
When a life-preserving resource rises, people have fewer grievances and less incentive to fight even if their share of the 
pie is smaller than that of others. People are more open to cooperate over resource innovation and management since 
the potential gains increase with resource availability. Rebels find it harder to mobilize recruits. These forces reduce the 
risk of civil war. We get hypothesis H1. 
H1:  An increase in a life-preserving resource reduces the risk of civil war. 
Contrary to H1, when a life-preserving resource rises, people have more energy and wealth, so they are more able to 
support the rebels and fight for their cause. Cooperation declines since there is less need to innovate and replace the 
resource substitute and/or find ways to manage a scarce resource, so people are more willing to consider the rebels‘ 
cause. We get hypothesis H2. 
H2:  An increase in a life-preserving resource increases the risk of civil war.  
A rise in an income-generating resource raises the incentives for rebels to seize it for financing their war effort, and for 
the state to hold it for financing its operations. A resource-rich region has a greater incentive to secede and keep the 
income, and the state has a greater incentive to keep the region, by force if need be. A resource-curse evolves, 
weakening the state by reducing its support. These forces raise the risk of civil war. We get hypothesis H3. 
H3:  Rises in income-generating resources increase the risk of civil war.  
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Contrary to H3, a rise in income-generating resource enables the state to repress a revolt before it turns into a civil war 
by financing better police and security forces. The state uses the income to pay its followers and to placate the public 
with free services. The state has more production inputs required for resource extraction than the rebels have, so it 
benefits relatively more due to a resource increase and can suppress revolts. We get hypothesis H4. 
H4:  Rises in income-generating resources reduce the risk of civil war.  
The sizes of effects may differ across onset and presence since considerations may change as a war goes on. Rises in 
life-preserving resources become more important as a civil war continues since war damages them, which reduces the 
provision of basic needs. The negative (H1) or positive (H2) effect of a rise in life-preserving resources on civil war is 
thus larger for presence than for onset. We get hypothesis H5: 
H5:  Rises in life-preserving resources have larger absolute value effects on war presence than on onset. 
As a war continues, however, casualties rise and families break up (e.g., people become stranded in different areas; 
people emigrate). Mental and physical energies decline and people become less responsive to a rise in a life-preserving 
resource in terms of joining combatants in the war, so fighting declines. We get hypothesis H6.  
H6:  Rises in life-preserving resources have larger absolute value effects on war onset than on presence. 
A rise in income-generating resources implies more income possibilities. It entices rebels to seize resources and use the 
money to start a rebellion, and the state to strengthen its police and security forces. As a civil war continues, damages to 
the resource sector reduce its income-generation effect. We get hypothesis H7. 
H7:  Rises in income-generating resources have larger absolute value effects on war onset than on presence. 
As a civil war continues, the economy declines, so the income-generating resources become more important for 
everyone. Combatants become more reliant on this income for their war effort activities. A rise in income-generating 
resources at this stage becomes relatively more important than when the war starts. We get hypothesis H8. 
H8:  Rises in income-generating resources have larger absolute values effects on war presence than on onset. 
4. Empirical Method 
All the hypotheses formulated in the previous section are logically plausible, so theory cannot decide among them. We 
need to conduct an empirical test. This section presents our empirical method. We seek to make general statements 
about the effect of resources on civil war, on average, so we use regression analysis for a large N sample of countries 
and years. Our theory suggests the effect of resource changes may vary by the resource. Variables that lump many 
resource types cannot capture such variation and may even generate misleading results. Including few resources is also 
problematic. Resources may affect each other since they are parts of the national economy and physical environment 
(e.g., agriculture uses oil; disasters destroy resources; water affects land productivity) and relying on one or a few 
resource measures may represent the effect of excluded resources. We need to include a broad set of life-preserving and 
income-generating resources. Our hypotheses also suggest the effect of resources may vary by onset and presence, so 
we need to examine models for both.  
4.1 Dependent and Independent Variables 
For the dependent variable, we include wars meeting the Fearon and Laitin (2003) criteria. (1) A government fought a 
non-state group that wanted to topple it, control a region, or change state policies by using violence. (2) At least 1000 
people died overall during the war years with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 people died on each side. 
Onset is set to one in the first year of a war and is set to zero otherwise. Presence equals one during each year of a war 
and equals zero otherwise.  
The independent or key variables include resource measures and population. For life-preserving resources, we include 
measures of fresh water, arable land, cropland, weather-related disasters (a rise in this variable is akin to a decline in the 
resource hospitable climate), and precipitation (a proxy for farming conditions, holding weather disasters constant). One 
cannot easily convert these resources to income on an ongoing basis, but their use supports life. For income-generating 
resources, we include timber extraction, fuel extraction, mineral extraction, and agricultural goods. One can quite easily 
convert these resource extractions to income by selling them to domestic and/or international buyers. 
WATER is the total yearly internal and external (flowing into a country) fresh water, per capita. Data in five-year 
intervals come from the AQUASTAT database of United Nation‘s Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); we 
interpolate to get yearly data. Internal water is in cubic meters (m
3
) per capita and external in billions of cubic meters, 
which we convert to cubic meters and divide by population. WEATHER DISASTERS is the yearly number of people 
killed by weather disasters (e.g., storms, floods, droughts), per million people. Data come from Environmental Data 
Explorer (EDE). PRECIPITATION is the mean yearly level in millimeters. Data in five-year intervals come from 
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AQUASTAT. ARABLE LAND includes land under temporary crops (sown and reaped in an agrarian period; e.g., wheat, 
rice, barely), temporary meadows for mowing and pasture, market and kitchen gardens, and farmland left fallow less 
than five years. Data in hectares per person come from the WDI database of the World Bank. CROPLAND is the land 
under permanent crops (e.g., fruits, grapes, olives, nuts). Yearly data, expressed in percent of the total area, come from 
WDI. 
TIMBER measures profits from logging trees suitable for conversion into industrial forest products (or round wood) as 
a percent of the gross national income, by country, per year. The FUELS variable is the total value of fuels exports 
(mostly but not exclusively fossil fuels such as oil), expressed as a share of merchandise exports of a country to the 
world. MINERALS measures profits in the mineral extraction sector (including tin, gold, lead, zinc, copper, nickel, 
silver, bauxite, and phosphates), as a percent of the gross national income, by country, per year. Data for these three 
resource extraction variables come from WDI. AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT is the value of agricultural commodities 
produced in a country per capita, computed at international prices, divided by this value in a base year. The data come 
from the FAOSTAT database of the FAO. Rises in the sizes of these empirical variables imply greater availability of 
income-generating resources. 
POPULATION is the log of population size. The data come from WDI. A rise in population generates competing effects 
on the risk of civil war. It raises pressure on life-preserving resources, increasing the risk of civil war via H1, but 
implies greater need to alleviate the pressure and more people that can do so (e.g., Simon, 1998), reducing the risk of 
war via H2. Population rise makes it harder to govern and raises the pool of potential fighters and grievances, but it also 
complicates the coordination and mobilization of people to revolt. The effect is thus unclear.  
4.2 Control Variables  
We include typical control variables. We discuss their expected effects quite quickly; unless we note otherwise they are 
unclear. GDPpc denotes the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in real terms from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A 
higher value may reduce war-risk, making people more content and states more able to subdue uprisings and solve 
problems; but richer rebels can finance more arms and recruits, raising the risk. TRADE, the sum of import and export 
values of a country divided by GDP, comes from WDI. A rise in trade may pacify by fulfilling needs, promoting growth, 
enabling states to arm, and stirring dispute resolution as war is bad for business; but it may reduce resources for home 
use, create job losses, damage the environment, and finance the rebels, increasing the risk.  
ETHNIC / RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATIONS are odds of two randomly drawn people belonging to different 
ethnic / religious groups. More fractionalization may raise animosity, but reduces group power. DEMOCRACY ranges 
from 10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). It comes from the Polity IV Project. More democracy enables 
expression of grievances and raises state openness, but also opposition formation. POLITICAL INSTABILITY is one if 
DEMOCRACY changes three points or more in any of the three prior years, and zero otherwise. A rise in instability 
raises the risk of war since it signals disorder and weakness at the center. The effect may be weaker on presence than 
onset since instability may become the norm as a war goes on.  
NONCONTIGUOUS TERRITORY is one if the land of another country or at least 100 kilometers of water separate 
areas with at least 10,000 people from the area containing the capital city, and is zero otherwise. MOUNTAINOUS is 
the estimated ratio of mountainous area to the total area, logged. The data come from Fearon and Laitin. Larger values 
raise the risk of civil war as they provide hideouts for rebels and make it harder for the state to reach them. The effects 
may be larger on onset than presence as states may finally move forces to such areas. WAR COUNT counts years of war. 
A higher count may promote presence by entrenching animosity, but may pacify by raising weariness. PEACE YEARS 
is a count of the years with peace since the last war ended. A higher value may reduce the risk of civil war, as people get 
used to peace, but may raise it, as they may forget the horrors of war.  
4.3 Econometric Issues 
Civil war may not occur even when all the factors thought to play a role in its onset are present and may occur even 
when those factors are absent. This reflects the inability to model and/or to know about all the factors that play a role. 
All civil war models for a large N sample are inevitably partial since the wars themselves differ in some respects. We 
thus model it as a probabilistic event using the Logit regression. We use one-tailed significance tests as our hypotheses 
predict certain signs. For the size of each effect, we use the following procedure. (1) We compute the predicted 
probability of war while setting a continuous variable to one standard deviation (S.D.) above its mean, holding the other 
continuous variables at their means and the binary variables at zero (politically stable and contiguous countries). (2) We 
compute the probability holding all the continuous variables at their means and binary variables at zero. (3) We compute 
and report the percent change of the first probability relative to the second. For the size of a binary effect, we use the 
same procedure while changing the associated variable from zero to one (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003).  
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Civil war may affect some of the factors that cause it (e.g., civil war can reduce GDP per capita). To alleviate this issue, 
we lag all the variables, as usual, except when civil war cannot affect them (namely, for water, precipitation, disasters, 
and mountainous and contiguous areas). Next, the model may face serial correlation from the prevalence of peace in the 
data, and heteroscedasticity since country data come in different sizes. To alleviate the risk of serial correlation, we use 
PEACE YEARS and three auxiliary (cubic splines) terms (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998), and to alleviate the risk of 
heteroscedasticity we define our variables as logs or ratios. We alleviate any remaining serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity by estimating robust standard errors clustered by country for the coefficient estimate. Last, we inspect 
the model‘s correlation matrix, variance inflation factors (VIF), and average VIF, to assess if multicollinearity is a 
concern; should it be a problem, we will take apt actions.  
5. Results 
Table 1 presents the estimation results. Appendix 1 lists the states in the sample, summary statistics, and correlation 
table.
vi
 The pseudo R
2
 is 0.84 for presence, which is high, and 0.21 for onset, which is typical. The largest correlation 
between any two variables (-0.63) occurs for TRADE and GDPpc, which are correlated by construction. The other 
correlations are smaller than 0.38. The largest individual VIF score is 2.29 for onset and 2.59 for presence. The average 
VIF score is 1.5 for onset and 1.72 for presence. Multicollinearity is not a concern. 
Table 1. Estimation Results 
         War Presence War Onset 
 Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Water 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Precipitation 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Arable Land -1.568** (0.750) 1.259** (0.762) 
Weather Disasters 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001** (0.005) 
Cropland 0.088*** (0.0054) 0.124 (0.111) 
Timber -0.096* (0.070) -0.199* (0.143) 
Agricultural Output 0.021*** (0.009) 0.034*** (0.012) 
Minerals 0.175*** (0.055) 0.128** (0.063) 
Fuels 0.012** (0.007) 0.023*** (0.008) 
Population 0.450*** (0.197) 0.541*** (0.217) 
GDPpc -0.120* (0.083) -0.522*** (0.170) 
Mountainous 0.108 (0.110) 0.539*** (0.198) 
Noncontiguous Territory 0.352 (0.577) 0.577 (0.909) 
Political Instability -0.313 (0.611) 0.727* (0.535) 
Trade -0.020** (0.010) -0.010 (0.012) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.788* (0.563) -0.237 (0.833) 
Religious Fractionalization -0.048 (0.906) 0.970 (1.315) 
Democracy 0.0021 (0.051) 0.036 (0.037) 
War Count 0.023 (0.028) NA NA 
Peace Years -3.019*** (0.561) 0.194 (0.216) 
Constant -3.233 (2.724) -15.147*** (3.418) 
N 1994  1944  
Pseudo R2 0.84  0.21  
Description: St. Error means standard error. Robust S.E. clustered by country in parentheses. *** means significant at 
1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. NA means not applicable. Three cubic spline variables are included but not reported. 
For the control variables, the POPULATION estimates are positive and significant for onset and presence. A rise in 
population raises the risk of civil war. This may indicate links from greater pressure on resources to war and/or a greater 
difficulty to govern, larger fighter pools, and more hideouts and supply sources for rebels. Higher GDPpc reduces the 
risks of onset and presence. More TRADE does not affect onset but reduces the risk of presence. An increase in the 
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value of MOUNTAINOUS raises the risk of onset and does not affect the risk of presence, supporting the expectation of 
a stronger effect for onset. NONCONTIGUOUS TERRITORY has no effect, perhaps due to its small variation.  
POLITICAL INSTABILITY raises the risk of onset and does not affect the risk of presence, supporting the expectation 
of a weaker effect on presence. DEMOCRACY has no effect. An increase in ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION does 
not affect the risk of civil war onset but raises the risk of presence. RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION and WAR 
COUNT have no effect. Changes in PEACE YEARS do not affect the risk of onset but lower the risk of presence. These 
results generally resemble those reported by other studies. Since the diagnostics reported above are also reasonable, we 
can say that our modeling platform is sound, so let us move to the resource estimates. 
For the life-preserving resources, the estimates for WATER and PRECIPITATION are insignificant; this may be due the 
low variability of these variables by country in our dataset. The onset estimate for ARABLE LAND is significant and 
positive. A rise in arable land raises the risk of war onset, supporting H2 (more life-preserving resource  higher risk). 
The reading is that people now have less of a need to cooperate over resource management and more energy and wealth 
and so are more willing and able to join the fighting. An alternative reading observes that a country has a finite stock of 
fertile land suitable for temporary crops. When ARABLE LAND rises, more of the fertile land is in use and less is 
available for others. The losers seek a larger share of the pie and so are more likely to fight to change the status quo, 
raising the risk of civil war. The presence estimate for ARABLE LAND is negative and significant. A rise in arable land 
reduces the risk of civil war presence, supporting H1 (more life-preserving resource  less risk). Ongoing civil war 
damages arable land and its temporary crops (e.g., wheat), as well as the storage warehouses, roads, and factories 
required to use them. At this stage, a rise in arable land eases pressures on a key resource for food and reduces 
grievances, reducing the risk of continued civil war. 
The estimates for WEATHER DISASTERS are positive and significant for both measures. A rise in weather disasters 
raises the risks of both civil war onset and presence. Viewing this rise as a fall in the life-preserving resource hospitable 
climate, these results support H1. The damages and shortages associated with weather disasters raise public gripes, 
making it easier for rebels to find recruits for their cause, and the associated damages to law and order and to 
transportation and communication networks make it harder for the state to subdue the rebels. 
The onset estimate for CROPLAND indicates that a rise in cropland raises the risk of war onset at the 0.13 level. The 
estimate for presence is significant and positive. A rise in cropland raises the risk of civil war presence. Both estimates 
support H2 (more life-preserving resource  higher risk) though we have relatively less confidence in the onset result. 
With more cropland, permanent crops rise, all else the same. People are stronger, enabling both state forces and rebels 
to find more recruits. Rebels have more incentive to seize cropland and sell its crops to finance their war effort. An 
alternative reading observes that a country has a finite stock of fertile land suitable for growing permanent crops (e.g., 
fruits, nuts). When CROPLAND rises, less is available for others. As with ARABLE LAND, those left out are invested 
in changing the system, raising the risk of civil war. Unlike for ARABLE LAND, the CROPLAND effect is also 
positive for presence, as it is relatively easier to transport permanent crops to the marketplace and convert them to 
income.  
For the income-generating resources, the estimate for TIMBER is negative and significant for onset and presence. A rise 
in timber extraction reduces the risk of civil war. This supports H4 (more income-generating resources  lower risk). 
Timber extraction requires special machinery, heavy-load transport, and large storage. The state has more of these 
resources than rebels do, so it gains relatively more when TIMBER rises. It can thus buy more arms and win support by 
paying followers and the public, subduing uprisings before they become civil wars. 
The estimates for AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT, MINERALS, and FUELS are positive and significant for civil war 
onset and presence. Increases in the values of these variables, taken one at a time, increase the risk of civil war, 
supporting H3 (more income-generating resources  higher risk). The reading is that increases in these resources 
intensify the adverse effects of the resource curse and create more opportunities for rebels to generate income for 
financing their war effort. 
Table 2 presents the size of effects; empty cells indicate no effect (insignificant coefficient estimate). A rise of one S.D. 
in ARABLE LAND above its mean, holding other levels at their mean and binary variables at zero, reduces the risk of 
civil war presence by 39% and raises the risk of onset by 49%. The absolute value effect is larger for onset, as in 
hypothesis H6. A rise of one S.D. in NATURAL DISASTERS above its mean, holding the other variables as before, 
raises the risk of civil war presence by 62% and the risk of civil war onset by 29%. The absolute value the effect is 
larger for presence, supporting H5. A rise of one S.D. in CROPLAND raises the risk of civil war presence by 36% and 
civil war onset by 53.4%. The probability that we read the onset effect correctly is 0.87. To compare the effects, we 
compute 53.4 x 0.87 = 46.46%; the absolute value effect for cropland is thus larger for onset, in line with H5. 
A rise of one S.D. in TIMBER reduces the risk of civil war presence by 15% and onset by 19%. The effect is larger for 
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onset, in line with hypothesis H7. A rise of one S.D. in AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT raises the risk of civil war presence 
by 98% and onset by 236%. The effect is larger for onset, in line with H7. A rise of one S.D. in FUELS raises the risk of 
civil war presence by 50% and the risk of civil war onset by 105%, in line with H7. A rise of one S.D. in MINERALS 
raises the risk of civil war presence by 169% and the risk of civil war onset by 80%, supporting H8. The support of H8, 
rather than H7, may reflect the relative ease of extracting, transporting, storing, and selling some minerals (e.g., gold, 
gemstones, silver, and phosphates) compared to our other three income-generating resources. This relative ease may 
better enable continued use of minerals in financing war efforts as the war continues and damages to the resource 
extraction sectors increase. 
Table 2. Sizes of Significant Effects 
 War Presence % War Onset % 
Arable Land -39.38 48.82 
Weather Disasters 62.21 29.31 
Cropland 36.01 53.43
†
 
Timber -14.62 -18.82 
Agricultural Output 98.20 236.17 
Minerals 169.38 80.27 
Fuels 50.35 105.57 
Population 73.19 111.56 
GDPpc -30.83 -74.07 
Mountainous  90.86 
Political Instability  95.23 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
26.12  
Trade -41.81  
Peace Years -100.00  
Description: 
†
 means significant at 0.13. 
Turning to the control variables, a rise of one S.D. in POPULATION raises the risk of civil war presence 73% and onset 
by 112%. A similar rise in GDPpc reduces the risk of onset by 74% and presence by 31%. A rise of one S.D. in the 
value of MOUNTAINOUS raises the risk of onset by 91%. The occurrence of POLITICAL INSTABILITY raises the 
risk of onset by 95%. A similar rise in ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION raises the risk of civil war presence by 26%. 
Rises of one S.D. in TRADE reduces the risk of onset by 42%, and in PEACE YEARS by 100%. Thus, states with 
greater population, mountainous area, political instability, and ethnic fractionalization face a larger a risk of civil war 
than other states. States with larger values of GDP per capita and trade and those with more years of peace face lower 
risks of civil war.   
6. Discussion 
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results. The estimated signs of effects for onset are similar to those for presence, 
except for arable land. Increases in disasters, cropland, agricultural output, fuels, and minerals each increase the risk of 
civil war. An increase in timber reduces the risk. An increase in arable land increases the risk for civil war onset and 
reduces the risk for presence. Water and precipitation play no role, probably reflecting, as noted, their low variation in 
the sample, by country. Countries with more weather disasters, cropland, agricultural output, fuel export, and mineral 
income, and less timber income are at higher risk of civil war onset and presence. The significant resource effects in the 
model are larger than, or are on par with, the non-resource effects; the effects of agricultural output and fuels on onset 
and minerals on presence are the largest among all the model‘s variables. The disaster and mineral effects are stronger 
on presence than on onset. The cropland, agricultural output, fuels, arable land, and timber effects are stronger on onset 
than on presence. Sorting the resource effects on onset by size gives the ranking agricultural output, fuels, minerals, 
arable land, weather disasters, and timber. Sorting the effects on presence gives the ranking minerals, agricultural output, 
weather disasters, fuels, arable land, cropland, and timber. 
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Table 3. Summary of Significant Results for Increases in Resources  
Resource 
Measure 
Effect on  
Onset Risk 
Effect on 
Presence Risk 
Larger  
Effect on  
Weather Disasters Increase Increase Presence 
Cropland Increase Increase Onset
†
 
Arable Land Increase Decrease Onset 
Water   NA 
Precipitation   NA 
Agricultural Output Increase Increase Onset 
Fuels Increase Increase Onset 
Minerals Increase Increase Presence 
Timber Decrease Decrease Onset 
Description: 
† 
means significant at the 13% level, empty cell means no effect, and NA means not applicable. 
These results are important, but one paper naturally can only do so much. Future research may examine measures of 
property rights and rent seeking, include more resources, enlarge the sample, and improve the precipitation and water 
measures. Other extensions may incorporate measures of state and rebel abilities to seize and sell resources and 
international intervention, or examine civil war escalation, duration, and termination. These extensions may be 
complicated, but are worth exploring using our framework to include many resource measures in one model. 
Taking a broader view, in recent decades, nearly all civil wars occurred in less developed countries (LDCs). LDCs are 
poorer than developed countries (DCs), more prone to political instability, more fractionalized ethnically (due to their 
colonial past), more dependent on resources for livelihood, have higher population growth, face more weather disasters 
due to their location, suffer more damage per disaster (due to weaker structures and defenses), and are less able to 
rebuild (since they are poorer). These features put them at a higher risk of civil war than DCs.  
Policies that reduce these factors reduce the risk, but the implications for timber are complex. A rise in timber reduces 
the risk of civil war, but extraction beyond the forest‘s maximum growth rate reduces its stock and is not sustainable. It 
will likely accelerate the rate of global warming and increase weather disasters, as most of the world‘s forests are in 
LDCs, and reduce land fertility and GDPpc, as LDCs depend on agriculture. These factors raise the risk of civil war. 
States can lower the risk by reducing dependence on minerals, fuel export, and agriculture. They should not avoid 
exploiting their resources; rather, they should invest the profits in developing other economic sectors and improving 
provision and quality of law and order, infrastructures, education, property rights, and other institutions to avoid the 
resource curse. 
Finally, what are the implications of our results for the coming decades, assuming they will hold? The U.S. 
government‘s National Intelligence Council (NIC, 2012) projects declining civil war risk to 2030 in states with a 
median age above 25, as in Latin America, and continuing high risk in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the 
Middle East, South Asia, and Asian-Pacific. We cannot comment on the regional aspect of this projection, but we can 
use our model to say something about the average tendency. 
We first need to project average resource and population levels to 2030. This large task falls outside the scope of this 
paper, so we rely on the NIC‘s expectations. The NIC expects declining availability of fuels, water, and minerals to 
2030, against a backdrop of rising population, rising weather disasters, and falling rainfall (in most world regions). 
Agricultural output, the NIC expects, will rise to meet a greater demand for food due to population growth, and 
deforestation will rise to support growing agricultural land requirements, suggesting timber will decline (as forest stock 
will fall) and arable land and cropland will increase.
vii
 
For these expectations, our results for weather disasters, agricultural output, cropland, arable land, timber, and 
population indicate a rising risk for civil war. Our model does not predict that changes in precipitation and water will 
affect civil war risk, but we believe this point bears examination with more nuanced data. The expected declines in fuels 
and minerals suggest declining civil war risk, but would reduce GDP per capita and trade for countries that rely on these 
resources for income. Should their GDP per capita and trade fall, they would face a higher risk of civil war. Generating 
an overall projection is not easy as there are competing effects, but rising chances for civil war still seem likely, just as 
the NIC expects, provided, again, that our estimates will hold, and the NIC‘s projections will arise. These conditions 
may not hold true, but it is better to prepare for a worse scenario that will not emerge than simply hope that it will not 
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come to pass. 
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Appendix 
Table 1.Countries in the Sample  
Countries  
Algeria  Angola  Argentina  
Armenia  Australia  Austria  
Azerbaijan  Bahrain  Bangladesh 
Belarus  Benin  Bhutan  
Bolivia  Brazil  Bulgaria  
Burkina Faso  Burundi  Cameroon  
Canada  The Central African Republic  Chad  
Chile  China  Colombia  
Congo  Costa Rica  Cyprus  
Denmark  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  
Egypt  El Salvador  Estonia  
Estonia  Ethiopia  Fiji  
Finland  France  Gabon  
Gambia  Georgia  Ghana  
Greece  Guatemala  Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  Guyana  Haiti  
Honduras  Hungary  India  
Indonesia  Iran  Ireland  
Israel  Italy  Ivory Coast 
Jamaica  Japan  Jordan  
Kazakhstan  Kenya  Kuwait  
Kyrgyzstan  Latvia  Libya  
Lithuania  Madagascar  Malawi  
Malaysia  Mali  Mauritania 
Mauritius  Mexico  Moldova  
Mongolia  Morocco  Mozambique 
Nepal  Netherlands  New Zealand 
Nicaragua  Niger  Nigeria  
Oman  Pakistan  Panama  
Papua New Guinea Paraguay  Peru  
Philippines  Poland  Portugal  
Romania  Russia  Rwanda  
Saudi Arabia  Senegal  Sierra Leone 
South Africa  South Korea  Spain  
Sri Lanka  Sudan  Sweden  
Switzerland  Syria  Tanzania  
Thailand  Togo  Trinidad Tobago 
Tunisia  Turkey  Turkmenistan 
Uganda  Ukraine  United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom  The United States of America  Uruguay  
Venezuela  Zambia  Zimbabwe 
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Table A2. Summary Statistics    
Variable Units Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Water m
3
/year 28462.88 59545.30 8 748217.00 
Precipitation mm/year 1113.25 747.33 51.2 3141.70 
Arable Land ha/person 344.78 3454.92 0.00025 51200.00 
Weather Disasters killed/million 13.22 233.13 0 7630.01 
Cropland % of area 2.66 3.66 0.00064 17.61 
Timber % of GNI 0.50 1.49 0 18.52 
Agricultural Output Index/person 106.13 79.79 9.5 1457.70 
Minerals % of GNI 1.49 5.25 0 82.59 
Fuels % of Mer. Exp. 16.13 35.24 0 99.99 
Population log (persons) 9.05 1.47 5.40 14.03 
GDPpc constant 1985 I$ 3.95 4.85 0.13 66.74 
Mountainous log (% of area) 2.11 1.42 0 4.56 
Noncontiguous Territory binary 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Political Instability binary 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Trade % of GDP 60.43 34.11 1.53 282.40 
Ethnic Fractionalization probability 0.40 0.29 0.001 0.93 
Religious Fractionalization probability 0.37 0.22 0 0.78 
Democracy index -0.59 7.53 -10 10 
War Count years 1.83 6.12 0 51 
Peace Years years 13.59 11.84 0 39 
Description: GNI means Gross National Income, Mer. Exp. merchandise export, and I$ international dollars (adjusted 
for purchasing power parity). 
Table A3. Correlation Table 
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i
 Several studies reviewed this literature over the years. Recent examples include Mildner, Lauster, and Wondi (2012), Koubi, 
Spilker, Tobias, and Bernauer (2014), and Murshed (2015). 
ii On links from scarcity and disasters to civil war, see, e.g., Homer-Dixon (2001), Kahl (2008), and Tobias (2015), and on links to 
peace see, e.g., Simon (1998), Eastin (2012), and Salehyan and Hendrix (2014). 
iii Le Billon (2012), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), and Basedau and Lay (2009) provide more discussion. 
iv For cases with a positive link from scarcity and/or natural disasters to civil violence see, e.g., Homer-Dixon (2001), Kahl (2008), 
Reuveny (2008), Matthew & Upreti (2010), Salehyan and Hendrix (2014), Tobias (2015), and Eastin (2015); the latter three also list 
case studies and actual cases where scarcity and disasters had no effect or pacified. 
v For examples of case studies on a link from resource abundance to civil war, see Klare (2002), Blondel (2004), Kahl (2005), and 
Le Billon (2012). Basedau and Lay (2009) provide examples for a link from resource abundance to lower risk of civil war. 
vi The estimation sample includes country-year observations in 1975-2000 for 123 countries. 
vii The NIC (2012) is not alone in these projections. For quite similar projections for civil war risk and resource tendencies to 2030 
and 2045 see, respectively, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS, 2012) and the Strategic Trends Programme 
(STP, 2014) of the United Kingdom government. 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Water 1 1.00
Arable Land 2 0.11 1.00
Weather Disasters 3 0.00 -0.02 1.00
Cropland 4 -0.20 -0.25 0.01 1.00
Precipitation 5 0.33 -0.27 0.08 0.30 1.00
Population 6 -0.24 0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 1.00
Agricultural Output 7 0.04 -0.10 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.24 1.00
Timber 8 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.14 0.13 0.06 -0.01 1.00
Minerals 9 0.35 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.14 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
Fuels 10 0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 1.00
Trade 11 0.12 -0.19 -0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.63 0.23 -0.07 0.14 0.15 1.00
GDPpc 12 -0.06 0.24 -0.04 -0.14 -0.24 0.00 -0.01 -0.27 -0.18 0.01 0.07 1.00
Mountainous 13 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.07 0.14 0.34 -0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.35 -0.08 1.00
Noncontiguous 14 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.22 0.18 0.35 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 -0.13 -0.14 0.35 0.08 1.00
Political Instability 15 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.16 -0.25 0.04 -0.12 1.00
Democracy 16 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.13 0.19 0.07 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.33 -0.06 0.44 0.07 0.34 -0.06 1.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 17 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.06 -0.07 0.24 0.09 0.08 -0.03 -0.33 0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.23 1.00
Religious Fractionalization 18 0.14 0.21 -0.04 -0.02 0.18 -0.12 0.03 0.12 0.07 -0.09 0.15 0.10 -0.20 0.10 -0.05 0.05 0.38 1.00
